The Border of This Nation Cannot Be Touched
“No one can violate the borders of a nation whose frontiers are guarded by vigilant eyes.” Kashmir is India’s crown and an inseparable part of the country. No force can take it away. Our armed forces are fully capable of defending it.
The combined area of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh is 224,739 square kilometres. Of this, 45% is administered by India and 55% by Pakistan and China. India administers 101,338 sq km (45%), Pakistan 85,846 sq km (38%), and China 37,555 sq km (17%).
Within India’s territory, the Kashmir Valley covers 15,520 sq km, Ladakh 59,146 sq km, and the Jammu region 25,294 sq km. Of the area under Pakistan’s administration, 13,297 sq km comprises what Pakistan calls “Azad Kashmir,” while 72,496 sq km is Gilgit-Baltistan.
In 1963, Pakistan ceded 5,180 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley to China under a bilateral agreement. Together with Aksai Chin, this accounts for the 37,555 sq km currently administered by China. India claims Aksai Chin, while China claims nearly 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh.
Thus, India’s northern and northeastern frontiers have remained disputed for seven to eight decades, imposing a heavy defence burden on both India and Pakistan. Pakistan seeks control over Muslim-majority regions, China considers Ladakh strategically vital for its western connectivity, and India is determined to retain Kashmir. Given these competing interests, a lasting settlement appears difficult unless all sides accept some form of mutually agreed status quo.
The Jammu region, covering about 26,293 sq km under Indian administration, is no longer a disputed issue. The larger Ladakh region (169,197 sq km) today stands divided: 72,496 sq km (43%) is administered by Pakistan as part of Gilgit-Baltistan, 37,555 sq km (22%) by China as Aksai Chin, and 59,146 sq km (35%) by India.
The remaining contested area is the beautiful Kashmir Valley, covering 28,817 sq km. The Pir Panjal Range separates it from the plains of Punjab to the southwest, while the Greater Himalayas connect it with Ladakh and Tibet in the north and east. India administers 15,520 sq km (54%) of the valley, while Pakistan administers 13,297 sq km (46%).
This division was not merely territorial—it also divided people. Despite being a Muslim-majority region, the Valley under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah remained with India, while many Muslims from the western mountainous areas, led by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, aligned with Pakistan and formed what became “Azad Kashmir.” The war of 1947–49 ended with the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC) in 1949, allowing both sides to govern their respective territories. However, according to this perspective, Pakistan continued to keep the dispute alive with external support.
Unable to achieve its objectives through conventional wars, Pakistan turned to proxy warfare by training militants. One unresolved historical question remains: what exactly was contained in the draft agreement prepared during the Agra Summit (July 2001) between Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf—a document reportedly prepared by then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh but never finalised?
India granted Jammu and Kashmir special constitutional status through Article 370 in 1949 and revoked that status in 2019. Pakistan has announced the integration of Gilgit-Baltistan into its constitutional framework. One may therefore argue that the territorial status on the ground has largely solidified: what each side administers has effectively become its own.
Yet, the New India aspires to the reunification of the entire former princely state. Within India’s territory, separatist sentiment is largely absent in Jammu and Ladakh. The Kashmir Valley—particularly South Kashmir and areas close to Pakistan—remains the most sensitive region. Ladakh’s strategic importance also makes China a direct stakeholder. Therefore, the issue extends far beyond the wishes of the Valley’s residents; it has become an international territorial dispute involving India, Pakistan, and China.
The population of the Kashmir Valley may be understood in two broad groups: the Valley Kashmiris and the mountain-dwelling Pahari Kashmiris. The Valley’s Sunni Muslim majority, whose ancestors were largely Buddhists or Hindus, appears largely content living within India under present conditions. Less is known about the sentiments of the Pahari Muslims across the Line of Control. Between these regions live the Bakarwal nomadic communities.
Because the Valley is surrounded by forests and mountains, securing the entire terrain requires enormous military resources. Soldiers often come from outside the region, while militants possess intimate local knowledge. This geographical familiarity can work to their advantage. Militants wait patiently like hunters, strike where they perceive a security gap, and disappear. When they find suicide attackers willing to participate, they use them as well.
My taxi driver from Katra to Srinagar, Mohammad Akbar, remarked, “Sir, never underestimate Pakistan-trained militants. One militant, in courage, endurance, and strategy, is worth fifty Indian commanding officers.” His statement may have been exaggerated, but it also serves as a reminder that underestimating militant capabilities can be dangerous.
The Bakarwal community often serves as informants for one side or the other. Until an operation concludes, no one knows with certainty where individual loyalties lie. Fear of death can alter anyone’s choices. Consequently, while the Indian Army lays traps for militants, militants may simultaneously attempt to trap the Army. Until an encounter ends, the true sequence of events often remains unclear. Sometimes an accident becomes a death, and sometimes a death is presented as an accident.
Most Muslims in the Indian-administered Kashmir Valley today consider themselves Indians and are generally content within India. However, issues affecting their community remain emotionally sensitive. The abrogation of Article 370 was not welcomed by many, and the elected Union Territory Assembly even passed a resolution seeking its restoration. They strongly support severe punishment—even capital punishment—for those responsible for attacks such as Pulwama and Pahalgam. At the same time, some object when the homes of parents or relatives of a militant are demolished after an attack, especially if neighbouring families also suffer damage. Among educated but unemployed youth who later become militants, one often finds traces of frustration and alienation. At the same time, many also appreciate the restraint shown by the Indian Army and acknowledge that no incident has occurred requiring national embarrassment. They are aware of the atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army in Bangladesh before 1971. Yet today, social media has become a powerful force in shaping public opinion. Earlier, rumours spread through word of mouth; now videos—whether old or new, local or from elsewhere—can easily mislead people.
War may be necessary to punish aggression, but it rarely offers a complete solution. If China becomes more directly involved alongside Pakistan, any conflict could become prolonged. It is difficult to dismiss the possibility that China may support Pakistan through satellite services, electronics, weapons, and logistics. Other global powers, too, have their own strategic calculations. Countries with defence industries may well see conflict as an opportunity to sell military equipment.
The Government of India has won considerable goodwill in Kashmir through infrastructure and development. Continued financial support beyond what is provided elsewhere could further reduce people’s hardships. Education and healthcare are largely free, which people appreciate. Electricity, however, is expensive, especially after 200 units of consumption. Political promises to waive electricity bills have remained unfulfilled. Encouraged by the tourism boom of recent years, many young Kashmiris borrowed from banks to buy taxis, horses, hotels, restaurants, and other tourism-related businesses. With tourism collapsing after recent violence, they now worry about loan repayments and mounting interest.
Although this is not a natural disaster, a human-made tragedy is still a disaster. What fault lies with poor families whose livelihoods have suddenly disappeared? How are they expected to survive? Some form of relief appears necessary. Perhaps non-governmental organisations also have a role to play.
We consider Kashmiris our own. Therefore, every act that reinforces that sense of belonging is important. As Mr. Raina (84) of Ishwar Ashram told me, “If we have accepted the geography, we must also accept its people wholeheartedly.”